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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to respond to Thomas Uebel´s criticisms of my comments 
regarding the current revisionism of Carnap´s work and its relations to Kuhn.  I begin 
by pointing out some misunderstandings in the interpretation of my article.  I then 
discuss some aspects related to Carnap´s view of the history of science.  First, I 
emphasize that it was not due to a supposed affinity between Kuhn´s conceptions and 
those of logical positivism that Kuhn was invited to write the monograph on the history 
of science for the Encyclopedia. Three other authors had been invited first, including 
George Sarton whose conception was entirely different from Kuhn´s.  In addition, I try 
to show that Carnap attributes little importance to history of science. He seldom refers 
to it and, when he does, he clearly defends (like Sarton) a Whig or an “old” 
historiography of science, to which Kuhn opposes his “new historiography of science”. 
It is argued that this raises serious difficulties for those, like Uebel, who hold the view 
that Carnap includes the historical or the social within the rational. 
Keywords: Carnap, History of science, Kuhn, Logical positivism, New historiography 
of science, Philosophy of science, Revisionism, Sarton 
 
  1. Introduction 
 
In his article “Carnap and Kuhn: On the Relation between the Logic of Science 
and the History of Science”, published in 2011 in the Journal for General Philosophy of 
Science, Thomas Uebel responds to my criticism of what I call the revisionism of the 
logical positivist work, particularly its thesis regarding the compatibility or intimate 
relation between the philosophies of science of Carnap and Kuhn.   
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My article, which appeared in 2007 in the same Journal, appealed for a 
broadening of the discussion on the subject, and I am grateful to Professor Uebel for re-
opening the case (considered closed by many), which gives me the opportunity to revisit 
and attempt to clarify my arguments in this new paper. 
Uebel´s article begins with the observation that my criticism “is of considerable 
interest”.  The reason he provides is that it “would raise a deep problem for the 
compatibility of Carnapian logic of science and Kuhnian philosophy-cum-history of 
science”.  But he adds a caveat:  “if it were correct” (p. 129).  And Uebel then sets out 
to demonstrate that this is not the case.   
Toward this goal, he seeks to present a brief summary of my article in section 1.  
I thus begin my response with some preliminary questions regarding his interpretation 
of my text.  According to the revisionists, Uebel writes,  
the publication of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions as a volume of the 
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science in 1962 did not amount to the placement 
of a ‘‘Trojan Horse’’ (Pinto de Oliveira 2007, 148 and 155) at the heart of the logical 
empiricist’s unified science movement that it has long been taken for. Instead, that 
publication reflected a much deeper though widely overlooked agreement about how to 
think about science. The argument to this effect proceeds along two routes which Pinto 
de Oliveira then criticises. The first route builds on the two letters by Carnap to Kuhn 
(of 12 April 1960 and 28 April 1962) in which Carnap expressed his approval of Kuhn’s 
project and of its realisation, first published and commented upon by George Reisch 
(1991). The second route employs the comparison of the ideas expressed by Kuhn and 
the philosophical tenets of the mature Carnap in order to unearth ‘‘deep affinities’’ 
(Friedman 2003, 20). (Uebel 2011, 130, my italics). 
And Uebel adds: 
According to Pinto de Oliveira, neither argument is convincing. The first route fails 
because the letters are ‘‘far too brief’’ (2007, 149) to support the interpretive weight put 
on them. And the second route fails to establish with sufficient depth ‘‘the compatibility 
between the two authors’ respective philosophies of science’’ (ibid, my italics).  
I was surprised by this interpretation of my writing.  To begin with, the problem 
regarding the letters is not that they are too brief, but rather that they are less important 
than Carnap´s work itself, although they should be considered historical documents.  
And in his work, Carnap never cites Kuhn.  Nevertheless, the revisionists take the letters 
3 
 
into account (which are favorable to the revisionist interpretation) but not the fact that 
Carnap neglects to mention Kuhn anywhere in his work (which does not favor the 
revisionist interpretation).  In addition, after identifying the two lines of argument used 
by the revisionists, as summarized above by Uebel, I was very explicit in saying that my 
article aimed to criticize only the first.  In other words, all my criticisms are aimed only 
at the revisionists’ first line of argument, as I stated in the last paragraph of the 
Introduction of my article (p. 149). 
This is not to say that some of my criticisms (such as the difference between 
Carnap and Kuhn regarding the discovery-justification distinction, and the fact that 
Carnap never cites Kuhn in his work) are not relevant to the revisionists’ second line of 
argument, as well.  However, this misinterpretation of the purposes of my article 
unfortunately leads Uebel to have unrealistic expectations of me (because related to the 
revisionists’ second argument).  He says that 
Reisch, Earman, Irzik and Grunberg, and Friedman all agree that Carnap and Kuhn 
share (1) similar ideas concerning the dependence of scientific knowledge claims on 
paradigms or lexical structures and logico-linguistic frameworks; (2) the view that 
radical theory change involves a change of language; (3) a conception of (possible) 
incommensurability as nontranslatability between scientific theories and, with it, the 
rejection of the idea that all facts are theory-neutral. Beyond that Earman and Irzik and 
Grunberg disagree on (4) whether Carnap and Kuhn share a holistic conception of 
meaning, and Irzik and Grunberg and Friedman seem to disagree on (5) whether Kuhn 
himself was right in seeing a major difference with Carnap in his own view that 
language change is ‘‘cognitively significant’’ (1993, 314). Pinto de Oliveira offers no 
discussion of these theses whatsoever (Uebel 2011, 131, my emphasis). 
It is my understanding that Uebel identified the discovery-justification 
distinction as being the central theme of my article, as this question is also related to the 
revisionists´ second argument.  However, this leads him to neglect my criticism of the 
historical work (or historiography) of the revisionists.  I criticize how they address the 
historical question of the publication of Structure in the Encyclopedia (and the letters). 
The excessive importance they attribute to the letters is only one of my criticisms, along 
with the fact that they fail to take into account the absence of any reference to Kuhn in 
Carnap´s work.   
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Added to this is the circumstance, also not taken into consideration in Reisch´s 
text (subsequently endorsed by other revisionists), that the publication of Structure 
resulted from a request made to Kuhn to write a monograph in the history of science for 
the Encyclopedia; and that this request was not made originally to Kuhn but had been 
made first to other historians who had declined.  When Reisch affirms that Kuhn´s work 
was carried out in response to an invitation from the positivists (1991, 265), but fails to 
point out these historical circumstances, he inadvertently suggests that the positivists´ 
invitation to Kuhn was to produce a text in the philosophy of science, and  so would be 
almost trivial to conclude that there is an affinity between the philosophies of science of 
positivism and that of Kuhn.  
It is in the context of these criticisms that I point to the revisionists´ neglect of 
the discovery-justification distinction, which Uebel recognizes “was not addressed in 
any of the discussions of the Carnap-Kuhn relation (...) criticised by Pinto de Oliveira” 
(p. 131). The distinction appears to be a fundamental element of the historical context in 
which the publication of Structure in the Encyclopedia occurred.  As I sought to show 
in my article, the positivists asked Kuhn to produce a work in the history of science and 
published it as such. This fact reflects a difference between positivism and Kuhn, since 
Kuhn certainly did not see Structure as a history of science work (nor do we).   It was a 
curious difference and important to explain, for which I turned to the discovery-
justification distinction, which was generally accepted by the positivists and denied by 
Kuhn.
1
   
This idea seemed promising to me because, in addition to shedding light on the 
difference between positivists and Kuhn with respect to the nature of Structure, it 
contributed to understanding about another important aspect of the historical process:  
the (slow) change in the meaning of “philosophy of science”, which to this day does not 
appear to be entirely consolidated.
2
 I should add that a change in the meaning of 
“history of science” was also underway, with the shift from the old to the “new 
historiography of science”, a question we will return to in the sections that follow.   
Because Uebel does not situate my reference to the discovery-justification 
distinction within the broader context of my criticism of the historical work of the 
                                                 
1
 See Hoyningen-Huene 2006, 124-128, and Pinto de Oliveira 2012, 120-121.  
2
 As is evident in the resistance one still observes to recognizing Kuhn as a philosopher of science.  See, 
for example, the quote of Agassi in my 2007 article (p. 152, note 4). 
5 
 
revisionists regarding the publication of Structure, I believe he has not fully evaluated 
it.  He goes on to ask in his article, “How convincing is Pinto de Oliveira’s criticism?” 
and responds:   
Once his caveat is noted one may of course grant his (now limited) claim (that the 
letters alone prove very little) and turn to the analyses given by Reisch, Earman, Irzik 
and Grunberg, and Friedman to argue that they have shown, on independent grounds, 
that there do obtain deep affinities between (selected) aspects of Carnap’s and Kuhn’s 
philosophies of science. Carnap’s letters are but the icing on the cake (p. 131). 
This supposedly limited reach of my article, to merely restricting the importance 
attributed to the letters taken in isolation (the only point highlighted in Uebel’s 
abstract), I have already denied above.  In truth, as I have tried to show, I contest 
Reisch’s interpretation (endorsed by the other revisionists) of the letters, and the 
publication of Structure in the Encyclopedia itself, in a broader sense, and I offer an 
alternative interpretation that avoids these criticisms. 
As I indicated in the first article, Michael Friedman considers two types of 
arguments in favor of the revisionist thesis.  With respect to the first argument, as I 
highlighted in my article, he writes: 
These expressions of approval [in the letters] by Rudolf Carnap – the generally 
acknowledged leading representative of logical empiricism – are certainly striking, and 
they must give serious pause to expositors of the conventional wisdom (Friedman 2003, 
20). 
Thus, despite my interest in it as an historical episode, it is Michael Friedman 
who attributes undue importance to what, according to Uebel, is merely “the icing on 
the cake”.  But I believe it is necessary to note that Friedman captures a relevant 
historical aspect associated with this argument.  It is considerably simpler and more 
immediate than the broad comparison of the works of Carnap and Kuhn required in the 
second argument of the revisionists, and has therefore, in practice, been equally 
effective in winning people over to the revisionist thesis.  It was for this reason that I 
cited, at the end of my earlier article, texts written by some authors (Salmon and 
Andersen) that present only this argument to justify or explain their endorsement of the 
revisionist thesis regarding the relation between Carnap and Kuhn. And it was for the 
same reason that I also wrote:  
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In short, regardless of whether the general revisionists’ thesis about the close 
relationship “between Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions and logical empiricist 
philosophy of science” is true or not, it seems to me that they are mistaken in supporting 
it (partly) on the fact that Structure was published in Encyclopedia (argument 1). If this 
is not the only or the best argument in favor of the revisionist thesis, it is certainly the 
most emblematic and deserves further discussion (p. 155).   
Uebel’s article provides the opportunity to re-open this discussion.  As his 
conclusion, he writes: 
Despite his own concentration on the formalist logic of science, Carnap recognised the 
legitimacy and usefulness of the empirical sciences of science and the incompleteness of 
a philosophy of science that only concentrates on the former. Whatever else the 
differences between Carnap and Kuhn may be, the recognition of the deep significance 
of history for a philosophical understanding of science is not what divides them (p. 
139). 
Aiming to participate in the discussion, I present some arguments below which I 
believe can clarify and reinforce the questions raised in my previous article.  They refer 
particularly to the history of science and its historiography, and this time directly 
address the revisionists’ second line of argumentation, as well. First, I emphasize that it 
was not due to a supposed affinity between Kuhn´s conceptions and those of logical 
positivism that Kuhn was invited to write the monograph on the history of science for 
the Encyclopedia. Three other authors had been invited first, including George Sarton 
whose conception was entirely different from Kuhn´s.  Furthermore, I try to show that 
Carnap attributes little importance to history of science. He seldom refers to it and, 
when he does, he clearly defends (like Sarton) a Whig or the “old” historiography of 
science, to which Kuhn opposes his “new historiography of science”. In the final 
section, it is argued that this raises serious difficulties for those, like Uebel, who hold 
the view that Carnap includes the historical or the social within the rational. 
 
 
2. Enriques, Sarton, Cohen, and Kuhn 
 
As mentioned above, I sought in my 2007 article to offer a more nuanced 
alternative to the interpretation of Reisch and other revisionists regarding the 
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publication of Structure in the Encyclopedia.  I tried to show, among other things, that a 
place for a work in the history of science had already been reserved in the Encyclopedia 
since the 1930s, and I cited various passages containing references to invitations made 
by the positivists in this regard to historians like Enriques, Bernard Cohen, and Kuhn. 
But the list of authors invited by logical positivism to write the monograph of 
the history of science was not complete.   One name need to be added to the list.  Paul 
Galison revealed that another author who was considered for publication of a work on 
the history of science in the Encyclopedia was George Sarton.  Galison says: 
History does take unexpected turns; here, I will argue, it did not. On many grounds the 
Kuhnian antipositivism is only awkwardly extricable from positivism, especially 
Carnap's, from which it emerged. But let us step back to understand in somewhat more 
detail the links between the Unity of Science movement and the history of science. 
Already in 1936, Charles Morris, the most active advocate of the Vienna Circle in 
America and an editor (with Carnap and Neurath) of the Encyclopedia, was keen to get 
George Sarton (one of the earliest and most vigorous boosters of the history of science) 
on the permanent committee of the movement. (…) To Morris, Sarton offered the 
possibility of grounding the Unity of Science movement with a sympathetic history of 
science. It was an eminently sensible choice: Sarton was a positivist (though more 
Comtean than logical). But in the end, Sarton declined for lack of time, disappointing 
Morris, who very much wanted the history of science in the second volume of the 
Encyclopedia: "you would have seen the whole larger significance of the history of 
science for a comprehensive science of science program." In his place, Sarton offered 
the services of his assistant, I. Bernard Cohen. Cohen, too, eventually withdrew, and it 
was then that the task fell to a third Harvard historian of science, Thomas Kuhn. 
(Galison 1995, 29-30) 
Thus Galison himself assumes a revisionist position, and appears to have done 
so even before the publication of Reisch’s article.
3
  Galison does not refer to Enriques, 
however, but Reisch says in his 2005 book that the invitation to write the monograph 
was passed from the Italian historian Federigo Enriques to Sarton, then to Bernard 
Cohen, and finally to Kuhn (Reisch 2005, 9). 
                                                 
3
 Galison writes in a note:  “Since the time that this paper was presented (March 1990), a fine article by Reisch 
has appeared that also discusses the Kuhn-Carnap interaction” (p 29, note 9). And  he mentions Reisch 1991. 
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And Kuhn himself mentions Sarton in an interview conducted by John Horgan 
in 1991. Kuhn quipped: “Before I was doing the history volume, Federigo Enriques was 
doing it then, and George Sarton was doing it. Neither of them survived. I barely 
survived but I did it”.
4
  
The list of invited authors thus appears to be:  Enriques, Sarton, Cohen, and 
Kuhn.  But it is not my purpose here to claim that the list is now complete.  What I 
would like to do, essentially, is show that this new or ‘lost’ link, the historian George 
Sarton, is particularly significant for the historical analysis outlined in my earlier article.   
Sarton was a prominent name in the institutionalization of the history of science 
as a discipline  beginning in the 1920s.  But he also championed the idea of cumulative 
progress and Whig historiography. Kuhn says about him in an unequivocally 
unfavorable manner:  
My notion was that there was a sort of history of science to do that Sarton wasn't doing. 
I mean, I would not have said then the sorts of things I would say now about him, and I 
recognize that in some very important sense he was a great man, but he certainly was a 
Whig historian and he certainly saw science as the greatest human achievement and the 
model for everything else. And it wasn't that I thought that it was not a great human 
achievement, but I saw it as one among several. I could have learned a lot of data from 
Sarton but I wouldn't have learned any of the sorts of things I wanted to explore. (…) 
There were a number of other people who taught it within one or another of the science 
departments. But what they taught often was not quite history in my terms, at least, not 
quite history; it was textbook history (Kuhn 2000, 282). 
In Essential Tension, Kuhn cites again Sarton as a reference among defenders of 
the Whig history or the idea of cumulative progress in science, which Structure directly 
argues against.  He speaks of “an almost continuous tradition from Condorcet and 
Comte to Dampier and Sarton” which “viewed scientific advance as the triumph of 
reason over primitive superstition, the unique example of humanity operating in its 
highest mode” (Kuhn 1977, 148).  
It is not my intent to argue here that traditional historiography of science is, for 
Kuhn, unhistorical (Cf. Pinto de Oliveira 2012, section 4). However, the discrepancy 
                                                 
4
 The interview (February 1991) served as a basis for a book by Horgan, although the passage was not 
published. The complete interview was found online at: http://www.stevens.edu/csw/cgi-
bin/shapers/kuhn/. Accessed in January, 2009.  
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between the historiographies of Kuhn and Sarton (and even their antipodal character) 
appears to illustrate an essential aspect only hinted at in my previous article.  I believe 
that the fact that Sarton as well as Kuhn were invited (one after the other) to write the 
monograph on the history of science for the Encyclopedia shows that the positivist 
editors were unconcerned about the nature of the historiography or the philosophical 
aspect underlying the work.  They did not take into account the large difference between 
the authors, which ranges considerably from the explicit cumulativism of Sarton to the 
explicit anti-cumulativism of Kuhn; from the old historiography of science to the new.
5
  
Unless revisionists aim to argue that the substitutions of the author throughout 
the process (which lasted from the 1930s until its publication in 1962, and passed 
through a list of names including Enriques, Sarton, Cohen, and Kuhn) precisely 
describe, through the different conceptions of the history of science, the evolutionary 
path of the logical positivist philosophy of science…  Obviously this would make no 
sense, given the fact that the reasons were circumstantial and the changes did not 
originate from the positivist editors themselves.
6
 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that, curiously, Galison and Richardson seek to 
mark the possible similarities among the historians invited to write the work about the 
history of science in the Encyclopedia.  Galison says that, after Sarton and Cohen 
declined, “the task fell to a third Harvard historian of science, Thomas Kuhn” (Galison 
1995, 30, my italics). Richardson, in turn, writes: 
…in the 1950s, the relations between Kuhn and his fellow Harvard historians of science 
and the logical empiricists and their students are instances of cross-fertilization and, at 
times, collaboration; certainly the logical empiricists seemed to think that the new 
historians who worked with James B. Conant were giving accounts of the history of 
science that illustrated their philosophical points (Richardson 2007, 354, my italics).   
                                                 
5
 See, for instance, Sarton 1937, especially chap.1. For a comparative analysis, see my forthcoming paper 
(with Amelia Oliveira) “Kuhn, Sarton, and the History of Science”.  
6
And Kuhn was invited to write the monograph of the history of science nearly ten years before its 
publication, when he had only written a few articles specific to the subject, some book reviews, and had 
not yet published his first book (The Copernican revolution, 1957). Regarding this, see Kuhn 2000, 291-
292, and the short list of his publications up until the beginning of the 1950s on pp. 325-326.  Regardless, 
it seems probable that the invitation to Kuhn would have resulted from his work as a professor in the 
History of Science course for non-scientists directed by Conant.  This already guaranteed his distinction, 
reinforced by Cohen´s recommendation, who had in turn been recommended by Sarton.  See Merton 
1979, 71-125.   
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Both Galison and Richardson refer to Conant as a point of unity or convergence 
among the other “Harvard historians”.  However, it is well to remember here, as I did in 
a note in Pinto de Oliveira 2012, that 
Kuhn acknowledges in Structure that it was James B. Conant ‘‘who first introduced me 
to the history of science and thus initiated the transformation in my conception of the 
nature of scientific advance’’ (Kuhn, 1970a, p. xi). Furthermore, the first edition of the 
book is dedicated to Conant, ‘‘who started it’’. Nevertheless, Kuhn in all his work does 
not refer to Conant as a significant influence in the emergence of the ideas that 
characterize the NHS [new historiography of science] (note 6, p. 118). 
As he did with Sarton, Kuhn also emphasizes his differences in relation to 
another Harvard historian of science who received an invitation from the positivists,  
Bernard Cohen. Kuhn says: “Bernard has done a lot of good for the history of science 
but he is not someone who thinks about development at all in the way I do. We've not 
seen eye to eye (Kuhn 2000, 283). 
 To conclude these crossed citations, Cohen himself places Conant alongside 
Sarton as a supporter of the idea of cumulative progress: 
Sarton’s analysis led him to conceive that a primary aspect of science was its 
cumulative character; in fact, he declared (1936, 5), science is the only “truly 
cumulative and progressive” activity of mankind – a judgment in which J. B. Conant 
(1947, 20) and others have concurred (Cohen 1985, 22).7   
In the section that follows, I seek to show that Carnap attributes very little 
importance to history of science. As a result, his manifestations on the subject are few.  
But when he does, as will be argued, it can be shown that he defends an historiography 
incompatible with that of Kuhn, and that it is in fact a characteristic example of the “old 
historiography” that Kuhn directly criticizes in Structure and elsewhere.    
 
3. Carnap and the history of science 
 
In a paper published in 1974, Bernard Cohen describes a picturesque episode 
about Carnap in relation to the history of science:  
                                                 
7
 Cohen cites Sarton 1936, 5, and Conant 1947, 20.  Preston also includes Conant among the advocates of 
cumulative progress (Cf. Preston 2008, 53).   
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Some thirty years ago, when Carnap was spending a term in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
I gathered up my courage and asked him whether he would speak to our graduate-
student history of science club. He was polite enough not to refuse at once; before 
giving me his answer, he asked me to walk home with him and to tell him why I found 
the history of science interesting and worthy of study. We spent a good bit of the 
afternoon together; in the end, he thanked me, and remarked that he felt be could not 
speak to our group. I had convinced him, he said, that he really was as unhistorically 
minded a person as one could imagine. He had nothing whatever to say, he concluded, 
about the study of the history of scientific ideas that could possibly be of interest to 
historians! (p. 310, note 10). 
This would have been an excellent opportunity for Carnap to explain the 
question of the division of labor and to cite, despite his own “specialization” in the logic 
of science, the important role that the logical positivism movement reserved for the 
history of science, if this were in fact his position.  After all, at the beginning of the 
1940s, he had already published at least a text (Carnap 1938) cited by Uebel in favor of 
the bipartite interpretation (see below).  And Cohen and his colleagues would have been 
very pleased and proud to learn that Carnap, despite not having written on the subject 
himself, attributed considerable importance to the history of science in his philosophy of 
science, to the point that he recognized “the deep significance of history for a 
philosophical understanding of science” (Uebel 2011, 139) or included the historical 
element in the idea of rationality.
8
 Indeed, Cohen´s history of science club would have 
been the ideal audience for such a revelation by Carnap…   
Consistent with the distance and lack of interest that he revealed to Cohen, 
Carnap rarely refers to the history of science. However, in his intellectual 
autobiography, published in 1963 in the volume edited by Schilpp, he explicitly 
mentions the history of science and relates it to his view of the history of philosophy.  
He refers directly to the Department of Philosophy at the University of Chicago, where 
he worked for many years and where great emphasis was given to the history of 
philosophy.  He writes: 
The methodological attitude toward the history of philosophy which the students 
learned was characterized by a thorough study of the sources and by emphasis on the 
requirement that the doctrine of a philosopher must be understood immanently, that is, 
from his own point of view, inasmuch as a criticism from outside would not do justice 
                                                 
8
 Uebel says that Carnap  “does not exclude the social from the rational” (2011, 134). 
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to the peculiarity of the philosopher in question and his place in the historical 
development. This education in historical carefulness and a neutral attitude seemed to 
me useful and proper for the purpose of historical studies, but not sufficient for training 
in philosophy itself. The task of the history of philosophy is not essentially different 
from that of the history of science. The historian of science gives not only a description 
of the scientific theories, but also a critical judgment of them from the point of view of 
our present scientific knowledge. I think the same should be required in the history of 
philosophy. This view is based on the conviction that in philosophy, no less than in 
science, there is the possibility of cumulative insight and therefore of progress in 
knowledge. This view, of course, would be rejected by historicism in its pure form 
(Carnap 1963, 41, my italics). 
In this excerpt, Carnap refers not only to the history of science but to its 
historiography, as well.  He highlights an aspect that he considers important in the 
historiography of science as well as in the historiography of philosophy, which is the 
critical judgment of past theories from the point of view of current knowledge. He sees 
this as being characteristically present in works on the history of science and absent in 
the works on the history of philosophy.  This is why he uses the historiography of 
science as a model for the historiography of philosophy, proposing that the historian of 
philosophy critically judge past theories of philosophy from the point of view of 
contemporary philosophy, just as the historian of science judges, in what Carnap 
believes to be an exemplary manner, the scientific theories of the past.  
It is worth adding that this Carnap´s attitude regarding the history of science and 
the history of philosophy is not an isolated attitude.  It is fully shared, for example, by 
Reichenbach. Reichenbach manifests similar thoughts in a more explicit (and radical) 
way in various texts on the history of philosophy and of science, particularly in The Rise 
of Scientific Philosophy (1951). In the preface to the work, Reichenbach writes: 
…this book may be used as an introduction to philosophy, and in particular, to scientific 
philosophy. Yet it is not intended to give a so-called "objective" presentation of 
traditional philosophical material. No attempt is made to expound philosophical systems 
with the attitude of the interpreter, who wishes to find some truth in every philosophy 
and hopes to make his readers believe that every philosophical doctrine can be 
understood. This way of teaching philosophy is none too successful. (…) If a 
presentation of philosophy is to be objective, it should therefore be objective in the 
standards of its critique rather than in the sense of a philosophic relativism. The 
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investigations of this book are intended to be objective in this sense (Reichenbach 1951, 
viii-ix, my italics).   
This idea of not intending, in an historical approach to philosophy, to explain 
philosophical systems with “the attitude of the interpreter” he supports based on the fact 
that, according to him, there exists a “philosophical truth”.   And this truth should not be 
confused with “philosophical opinions” which the interpreter uncritically seeks to 
present as a “collection of truths”, as though there were a truth relative to each 
philosophy, and each philosophy could be pointed to as a different version of wisdom.  
Unlike the interpreter, understood in this sense, the “competent historian” for 
Reichenbach, as for Carnap, should be critical.  Reichenbach writes:  
I do not wish to belittle the history of philosophy; but one should always remember that 
it is history, and not philosophy. Like all historical research, it should be done with 
scientific methods and psychological and sociological explanations. But the history of 
philosophy must not be presented as a collection of truths. There is more error than truth 
in traditional philosophy; therefore, only the critically minded can be competent 
historians. The glorification of the philosophies of the past, the presentation of the 
various systems as so many versions of wisdom, each in its own right, has undermined 
the philosophic potency of the present generation. It has induced the student to adopt a 
philosophic relativism, to believe that there are only philosophical opinions, but that 
there is no philosophical truth (Reichenbach 1951, 325).   
The history of philosophy is identified by Reichenbach as a “philosophical 
museum” (Cf. Reichenbach 1951, 123-124), in which philosophy is dead, while the 
philosophy of the “live present” is practiced in an unhistorical manner, disconnected 
from the past. Or it is practiced historically, but only to the extent to which “the 
creators”, or those who work in the field of philosophy “productively”, in the present as 
in the past, do not care about the opinions of their predecessors (Cf. Reichenbach 1931,  
84). And Reichenbach writes in the same place, accentuating the importance of the 
contemporary perspective:  
Compared to earlier times, the situation has changed so completely that the ancients can 
no longer be fruitful for us. (…) Let those for whom, as Kant says, 'history of 
philosophy is philosophy itself' spend their time in studying the writings of the great 
philosophers of the past. We would rather emulate these great men in another respect; 
all of them were ahistorical thinkers, and did not care about the opinions of their 
predecessors. (…) Our modern task can only be performed without consideration of 
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tradition, in close contact with the problems that scientific discoveries pose for the 
philosopher. (…) For the creators, logical connections are important; historical 
connections will be established as a matter of course (Reichenbach 1931, 84. See also 
Reichenbach 1951, 325, excerpt cited by Mormann and Ibarra 2010, 93-94). 
 The superiority of the contemporary moment, because of the peculiarity of its new 
problems or the theoretical (or technical) superiority for approaching old problems, is 
what would justify the critical point of view, “an objective” criticism of the theories of 
the past. For Reichenbach, as for Carnap, what can be verified regarding the history of 
science is what should count as well for the history of philosophy. Reichenbach writes 
in 1948:  
 Everyone who has taught the history of philosophy, whether he did it with more or less 
enthusiasm, is familiar with the feeling of dissatisfaction with which he often went 
home from his classes. (…) Why should we teach it, if there is no outcome, no 
recognized truth? (…) The philosopher of the twentieth century should have enough 
intellectual distance from the constructions of his predecessors to be capable of an 
objective critique, and he should have the courage to say what is wrong with philosophy 
since it is evident that philosophy has been unable to develop a common doctrine that 
could be taught to students with the general consent of all those who teach philosophy 
(Reichenbach 1948, 135-136). 
And he continues: 
Those among us who have taught one of the sciences will know what it means to teach 
on a common ground. The sciences have developed a general body of knowledge, 
carried by universal recognition, and he who teaches a science does so with the proud 
feeling of introducing his students into a realm of well-established truth. Why must the 
philosopher renounce the teaching of established truth? Why must he qualify all his 
teachings by the clause 'according to the view of philosopher X' and restrict his 
objectivity to the statement of what was the view of philosopher X? (…) Imagine a 
scientist who were to teach electronics in the form of a report on views of different 
physicists, never telling his students what are the laws governing electrons. The idea 
appears ridiculous. Though the physicist does mention the history of his field of study, 
the views of individual physicists appear as contributions to a common result 
established with a superpersonal validity and universally accepted. Why must the 
philosopher forgo a generally accepted philosophy? (Reichenbach 1948, 136).  
It should be noted that this 1948 article by Reichenbach (like the 1931 article 
also cited above) was reprinted in Modern Philosophy of Science.  The book was 
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published in 1959 and includes a preface written by Carnap where he refers to 
Reichenbach as someone who shares his own views.  Carnap identifies scientific 
philosophy with logical empiricism and describes them like a logical analysis.  He 
writes: 
Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953) was one of the founders of the movement of scientific 
philosophy or logical empiricism, and one of its most vigorous and most productive 
representatives. In Essay IV [1931] of this book, Reichenbach has clearly outlined the 
aims and methods of the new way of philosophy which is characterized by its close 
relationship to scientific work. (…) It strives to reveal the main features of the scientific 
method by a logical analysis of the hypotheses, observations, and conventions which 
enter into the construction of a scientific theory (Reichenbach 1959, vii).  
And Carnap continues: 
The papers collected here illustrate well the method of philosophy just characterized. (..) 
The first papers were published in German in the period from 1921 to 1932; they let us 
feel the élan and the optimistic anticipations of a pioneer in the newly opened field. 
Reichenbach subsequently developed the conceptions formulated here and presented 
them in a more definitive form in later publications [The rise of scientific philosophy 
(1951)] (Idem, vii-viii). 
And it is worth to emphasize that in 1951 Reichenbach writes that “scientific 
philosophy attempts to get away from historicism and to arrive by logical analysis at 
conclusions as precise, as elaborate, and as reliable as the results of the science of our 
time” (Reichenbach 1951, 325). 
To situate the position of Reichenbach and Carnap in relation to the history of 
science (and the history of philosophy), one needs only to compare it precisely to the 
perspective of a philosopher of science like Kuhn. In addition to conferring a privileged 
role to history in the investigation of science, Kuhn is himself an historian. I believe the 
question should be put plainly:  Are Reichenbach and Carnap not defending the theses 
of the “old historiography” of science, against which Kuhn contrasts his “new 
historiography” at the very beginning of Structure? 
In texts that are widely known, Kuhn describes the traditional conception which 
values precisely the critical perspective regarding the past from a contemporary point of 
view.  I cite only one of them here: 
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If science is the constellation of facts, theories, and methods collected in current texts, 
then scientists are the men who, successfully or not, have striven to contribute one or 
another element to that particular constellation. Scientific development becomes the 
piecemeal process by which these items have been added, singly and in combination, to 
the ever growing stockpile that constitutes scientific technique and knowledge. And 
history of science becomes the discipline that chronicles both these successive 
increments and the obstacles that have inhibited their accumulation. Concerned with 
scientific development, the historian then appears to have two main tasks. On the one 
hand, he must determine by what man and at what point in time each contemporary 
scientific fact, law, and theory was discovered or invented. On the other, he must 
describe and explain the congeries of error, myth and superstition that have inhibited the 
more rapid accumulation of the constituents of the modern science text (Kuhn 1970, 1-
2, my emphasis). 
According to Kuhn, it is precisely in opposition to this way of conceptualizing 
science and its history, and to the work guided by it, that an “historiographic revolution” 
emerges: 
Gradually, and often without entirely realizing they are doing so, historians of science 
have begun to ask new sorts of questions and to trace different, and often less than 
cumulative, developmental lines for the sciences. Rather than seeking the permanent 
contributions of an older science to our present vantage, they attempt to display the 
historical integrity of that science in its own time (Kuhn 1970, 3, my emphasis). 
Concerning the history of philosophy, Kuhn, who is an historian of science, is 
understandably less explicit.  Nevertheless, there is no shortage of texts on which he 
expresses himself with clarity in this regard.  In “The Relations between History and the 
History of Science”, he writes: 
 The history of philosophy, as taught within philosophy departments, is often, for 
example, a parody of the historical. Reading a work of the past, the philosopher 
regularly seeks the author's positions on current problems, criticizes them with the aid 
of current apparatus, and interprets his text to maximize its coherence with modern 
doctrine. In that process the historic original is often lost (Kuhn 1977, 153). 
He also commented informally, in the interview published at the end of his last 
book,  The Road since Structure: 
 …I tried to talk a little bit about my experience of having philosophers and historians 
and scientists in the same classroom. The philosophers and the scientists are much 
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closer to one another, because they all come in being concerned about what's right and 
wrong -- not about what happened -- and therefore tending to look at a text and simply 
pick out the true and the false from a modem point of view, from what they already 
know (Kuhn 2000, 315).  
To conclude this section, we could say that both Reichenbach and Carnap 
propose and defend the “old historiography” of science; an historiography of science 
which criticizes past theories from the vantage point of the contemporary scientific 
perspective.  And the same should be true then for the history of philosophy.  In this 
sense, according to Carnap, as we saw, the historian of philosophy should imitate the 
example of the historian of science who, in addition to describing scientific theories, is 
concerned with presenting a “critical judgment of them from the point of view of our 
present scientific knowledge” (as George Sarton did). This would make it possible to 
speak, in the case of philosophy as well, of “cumulative insight” and “progress in 
knowledge” (Cf. Carnap 1963, 41).  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
I believe I can conclude by maintaining that the above arguments reveal serious 
difficulties in the interpretation presented by Uebel in his 2011 article and which he 
refers to as “bipartite metatheory” (p. 136. See also Uebel 2010).  As Mormann and 
Ibarra (2010, 74) summarize: 
Recently Thomas Uebel dubbed Carnap’s envisaged bipartite approach, which, 
according to him, was also favoured by Frank and Neurath, the “bipartite metatheory” 
of the Vienna Circle’s logical empiricism. The bipartite metatheory was designed to be 
the successor discipline of traditional metaphysically contaminated epistemology and 
philosophy of science. This “bipartite metatheory” was said to have two components: 
(1) a logical component in the sense of a Carnapian logic of science; 
(2) an empirical part roughly in the sense of Neurath’s “behavioristics of scholars” or 
Frank’s “pragmatics of science”. 
Within this framework, Mormann and Ibarra (2010, 76) imagine that Carnap  
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might have hoped to use Kuhn’s work as a substitute for the underdeveloped non-
logical half of the bipartite theory that he himself could not take care of, and whose 
realization had been neglected also by his fellow empiricists. 
I reject this idea, which seems in a way to have also been embraced by Uebel 
and other revisionists.  One of my reasons is pointed out by Mormann and Ibarra (2010, 
77): 
Even Carnap himself, in his later writings after the publication of Structure in 1962, 
never mentioned Structure – not even in his semipopular non-technical Philosophical 
Foundations of Physics (Carnap 1966) where mentioning Structure would have been 
quite appropriate - if one considers Structure as relevant for philosophy at all. 
Apparently, Carnap did not. For him, Structure remained a “nice piece” of history of 
science. 
This fact has been seldom noticed in the growing literature on the alleged similarity or 
alliance between the views of Carnap and Kuhn. An exception is the recent paper of 
Pinto de Oliveira (Pinto de Oliveira 2007). He considers as the cause of this omission 
Carnap’s strict separation between history of science and philosophy of science.9 
In addition to this criticism of mine, I identify here three points of tension in 
Uebel´s interpretation.  The first is the fact that the editors of the Encyclopedia did not 
take into account the historiography or underlying philosophical aspect of the history of 
science work.  It was not due to a supposed affinity between Kuhn´s conceptions and 
those of logical positivism that Kuhn was invited to write the monograph on the history 
of science. Three other authors had been invited first, including Sarton whose 
conception was entirely different from Kuhn´s.   
The second inconsistency results from Carnap´s lack of interest in the history of 
science, revealed, as we saw, by action and omission.  I believe that this disinterest 
cannot be conveniently explained by the division of labor argument. The very idea of 
division of labor depends on the positive valuation of someone else’s work in the 
complementary area. Carnap not only did not write any works on the history of science, 
he also showed no interest in the discipline compatible with the importance attributed to 
it in Uebel’s interpretation.    
                                                 
9
 I am not referring to a “strict separation” between the disciplines, but as I argue throughout this article, 
that Carnap attributes only a traditional and very secondary role to the history of science.  
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The third point of tension is in Carnap´s conception regarding the historiography 
of science.  He seldom refers to the history of science, but when he does, he appears to 
clearly defend a Whig historiography or what I called the “old historiography of 
science”, which is opposed to what Kuhn calls the “new historiography of science”. It is 
strictly because of this new historiography that Kuhn attributes a distinct and important 
role to the history of science in the philosophy of science (See Hoyningen-Huene  1993, 
chap. 1, and Pinto de Oliveira 2012, 115). 
 
I believe that Uebel is not entirely correct with respect to the “ideological” 
spectrum of the members of the Vienna Circle.  In a classification based on the relative 
positions assumed in the debate regarding the protocol sentences, he admits that Carnap 
is part of the “left wing” of logical positivism, alongside Neurath. And so he extends 
that classification also to the debate which concerns us here, regarding the role of the 
history of science. On the contrary, as Hempel emphasizes,  
Neurath’s ideas differed fundamentally from those mainstream logical empiricism as 
advocated by Carnap (…) Carnap and Popper (but not Neurath, as will be seen below) 
were emphatic in rejecting such a “naturalistic” view. Accordingly, they held it to be 
strictly irrelevant for the logical analysis of science to study the biological, 
psychological, and sociological factors that can affect scientific inquiry as a concrete 
human activity  (Hempel 2000, 300-301, my italics). 
And he continues, aiming to emphasize the secondary nature of the “naturalist” 
approach to science for Carnap:  
There was, to be sure, a polite bow in the direction of a pragmatic study of 
psychological, historical, political, and social facets of actual scientific research 
behavior: such study might shed light on the ways in which that behavior deviates  from 
analytic-empiricist standards (Hempel 2000, 301, my italics).
10
 
It is worth comparing the passage with a text by Feigl that I cited in my 2007 
article (p. 153):  
I do not for a moment deny the psychological, social, economic or political factors that 
have on many occasions had a powerful influence upon the thinking of scientists. But to 
become aware of these distorting influences is already the first step toward their 
successful elimination (Feigl 1961, 15, my italics).  
                                                 
10
 It should be taken into account that Hempel calls Carnap´s theoretical position “analytic empiricism”.  
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In light of this, I think it is very difficult to support a bipartite interpretation in 
the strong sense intended by Uebel, in which, as he says, Carnap “does not exclude the 
social from the rational” (p. 134).  What Hempel (and Feigl) said about Carnap is 
precisely that the social (like the historical) serves only to indicate and explain the 
deviations in relation to the previous pattern of rationality established by the logic of 
science.  This becomes even clearer when compared to Kuhn´s perspective, as described 
by Hempel himself: 
Yet despite his naturalistic, socio-psychological account of theory choice, Kuhn calls 
science a rational enterprise. Thus he declares: “scientific behavior, taken as a whole, is 
the best example we have of rationality,” and “if history or any other empirical 
discipline leads us to believe that the development of science depends essentially on 
behavior that we have previously thought to be irrational, then we should conclude not 
that science is irrational, but that our notion of rationality needs adjustment here and 
there.” (Hempel 2001, 359).11 
By the way, it seems strange that Hempel, whose early mentor was Carnap and 
who was later widely influenced by Kuhn, does not refer to the supposedly strong 
philosophical relations between the two authors.  It is noteworthy, however, that 
Hempel, at the same time, points out the similarities between Kuhn and Neurath.  He 
writes, for example, that “with respect to their pragmatic-sociological orientation, the 
ideas of Neurath share a clear affinity with the ideas of Kuhn” (Hempel 2000, 194).  
In truth, Hempel pointed out an opposition in the Vienna Circle between “two 
quite different schools”: Schlick and Carnap’s program, on the one hand (what we could 
call the right wing), and the more pragmatic focus of Neurath, on the other (the left 
wing). According to Hempel, in fact, the latter program was not attacked by the critics 
of positivism and is as alive now as it was before (Cf. Wolters 2003, 117-118. See also 
Hoyningen-Huene 1992b, 89-94).   
Uebel writes in his article:  
So far my argument still leaves unaddressed the claim that Carnap did classify Kuhn’s 
work as history of science and he was wrong to do so. One correct point that we can 
take from Pinto de Oliveira’s critique is that Carnap did indeed understand and 
appreciate Kuhn’s work as history of science, not as philosophy of science. But this 
point only raises thorny questions, it does not answer them (p. 135). 
                                                 
11
 Hempel quotes from Kuhn 1971, 144, and Kuhn 1970b,  264. 
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In the historical context that I sought to present here, if I am in fact correct 
regarding the point that Uebel (like Wray
12
) kindly conceded to me, I think that it does 
answer the questions.  And I would not say that Carnap was wrong in thinking what he 
thought about Kuhn´s work.  I believe that he merely saw it from his own perspective, 
and obviously, owes us no apologies for that.  After all, it was necessary to spend a 
considerable amount of ink over the past 50 years – since Kuhn’s Structure was 
published – to finally be able to say (some of us still apprehensively) that we changed 
perspective in the philosophy of science.   
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